Constitutional Law—The President’s Constitutional Obligation to Maintain Congressionally Funded Programs and Agencies by unknown




Constitutional Obligation to Maintain
Congressionally Funded Programs and Agencies
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Constitutional Law—The President’s Constitutional Obligation to Maintain Congressionally Funded Programs and Agencies, 8 Urb. L. Ann.
323 (1974)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/20
THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
TO MAINTAIN CONGRESSIONALLY FUNDED
PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES
On January 29, 1973, President Nixon submitted his Budget Mes-
sage to Congress for fiscal 1974. In that message, the President spe-
cifically stated that no funds were being requested for the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO),' a federal agency in the executive
branch created by congressional legislation.2 The President also di-
rected that the functions of the Community Action Agencies (CAA),
the local agencies of OEO, be transferred to ongoing programs and
local agencies financed by special revenue sharing funds.3 This action
would have made the existence of OEO as a separate federal agency no
longer necessary.4 On that same date, two days before his appoint-
ment as Acting Director of OEO, Howard J. Phillips issued a memo-
randum to all OEO regional offices, stating that CAA funding would
terminate on July 1, 1973, since funds had not been requested in the
fiscal 1974 Budget Message. 5 Furthermore, no CAA funds would be
granted by OEO except for phase-out activities.6 Failure of a CAA
to submit an "acceptable" phase-out plan 120 days prior to the
termination date would result in the summary suspension of its
OEO funds.7 The Economic Opportunity Amendments of 19728 pro-
1. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974 at 105-07, 994 (1973).
2. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2941(a) (1970).
3. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1, at 106-07.
4. Id.
5. Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 71
(D.DC. 1973).
6. Id. at 72. The funding process consists of four steps: legislative authoriza-
tion of the program, legislative authorization of funds for the program, executive
allotment of the authorized funds, and legislative appropriation of funds to be
spent in a fiscal year. Since defendant refused to wait for possible congressional
action under the final step, a conflict arose between defendant's directive from the
executive branch and the congressional intent as evidenced by Congress' multiple
year authorization to maintain CAAs. Id. at 74.
7. Id. at 66. The memorandum of January 29, 1973, was succeeded by OEO
Instr. 6730-3 (March 15, 1973).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2702(b)-2995(d) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2702-2995(d) (1970).
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vided that the Director of OEO "shall carry out" the CAA administra-
tion of Community Action Programs through June 1975 with such
appropriated funds as Congress may authorize,9 "and shall not delegate
his functions under section 221 10] ... to any other agency." 1 Pursuant
to this amendment, Congress authorized funds for Community Action
Programs through June 1975.12
Three lawsuits were instituted to challenge Howard J. Phillips'
directives ordering the dismantling of OEO and its programs contrary
to congressional authorization of funds for OEO's continued opera-
tion. These lawsuits were consolidated in Local 2677, American Fed-
eration of Government Employees v. Phillips.'3 Plaintiffs in Phillips
argued that defendant, as a member of the executive branch, was
obligated to spend the congressionally appropriated funds for imple-
menting, not terminating, OEO programs under the constitutional
responsibility of the President to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed."' 4 They based their claim on the duty of the Director
to "carry out" OEO programs through June 1975, as stated in the
legislative authorization, 5 and the subsequent congressional appro-
priation for OEO through June 1973.16 Plaintiffs further claimed that
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2837 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2837 (1970).
10. Section 221 of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2808
(1970), deals with general provisions for financial assistance to CAAs for Com-
munity Action Programs.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2942 (Supp. II, 1972).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2702b(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless expressly in limitation
of the provisions of this section, of the amounts appropriated ... the Director
of the Office of Economic Opportunity shall for each such fiscal year reserve
and make available not less than $328,900,000 for programs under section 2808
of this title ....
Both 42 U.S.C. § 2837 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 2702b(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1972)
were legislative authorization bills for which Congress must still appropriate funds
through an appropriation bill before the program can operate. Section 2837 is
referred to as "legislative authority." It neither authorizes nor appropriates a set
amount of funds but confers the legislative authority to do both. Section
2702b(c) (2) authorizes a specific amount of funds in pursuance of the "legislative
authority." Congress can then appropriate to OEO for each fiscal year any amount
up to that listed in the above quoted statute authorizing the maximum amount.
ENACTMENT OF A LAW, S. Doc. No. 35, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1967).
13. 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2837 (Supp. I, 1972).




the congressional authorization lasting until June 1975 required de-
fendant to provide funds to CAAs until either no authorized funds
were left or until Congress decided not to appropriate further funds
for OEO for the fiscal year 1974-75.17 Defendant contended that since
he could not spend funds until appropriated he must look to the
President's Budget Message for future planning.1s If no funds had
been proposed in the Budget Message, he must terminate the pro-
gram to effect the least waste and prevent financial chaos.19
The federal district court rejected defendant's rationale on four
grounds: the amended Budget and Accounting Act of 1921; the OEO
Act; the history of OEO appropriations; and the Constitution. The
court first held that the language of the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921,-" along with its legislative history,21 showed that the Presi-
dent's budget was a mere proposal. Furthermore, defendant's order
failed to maintain fiscal responsibility as required by the OEO Act 22
and was in violation of congressional intent to keep the CAA pro-
grams ongoing through multiple year authorizations.23 The court
stated that Congress had never appropriated funds for OEO before
17. 358 F. Supp. at 72.
18. Id. at 73.
19. Id. at 73, 79. The Director relied on the constitutional provisions that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President" and that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
20. (a) The President shall transmit to Congress during the first fifteen days
of each regular session, the Budget, which shall set forth his Budget message,
summary data and text, and supporting detail. The Budget shall set forth
in such form and detail as the President may determine-
(5) estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary in his
judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year.
31 U.S.C. § ll(a)(5) (1970).
21. H.R. Rrp. No. 362, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1919) states:
tT]he President's responsibility ends when he has prepared the budget and
transmitted it to Congress. . . . [The proposed law does not change in the
slightest degree the duty of Congress to make the minutest examination of
the budget and to adopt the budget only to the extent that it is found to be
economical. If the estimates contained in the President's budget are too large,
it will be the duty of Congress to reduce them. If in the opinion of Congress
the estimates of expenditure are not sufficient, it will be within the power of
Congress to increase them. The bill does not in the slightest degree give the
Executive any greater power than he now has over the consideration of appro-
priation by Congress.
(Emphasis added.)
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2835(d) (1970).
23. 358 F. Supp. at 75.
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the beginning of the upcoming fiscal year of the appropriation. 24
Therefore, defendant could not assume that Congress would not
appropriate OEO funds for the upcoming fiscal year.25 The court
refused to accept defendant's argument that fiscal chaos would result
if Congress did not appropriate further funds since Congress could
always provide special termination funding.2 Finally, the court de-
cided that defendant's order to use Community Action Program funds
solely for the program's termination was unconstitutional. 27 Since
defendant was a member of the executive branch, the court held that
he could not utilize legislative power to terminate congressional pro-
grams because the Constitution vests "All legislative Powers" in the
Congress. 28 Furthermore, the court believed that an officer of the
executive branch could not order the termination of a congressionally
enacted program upon the President's failure to request necessary
funds in his Budget Message since this action would, in effect, give
the President a veto power through his Budget Message that is not
granted by the Constitution.29
Presidential impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds
covers only one area of potential presidential power. 30 The same type
of judicial inquiry, however, is made in every case in which there is
a dispute over the validity of an executive action.3' The critical ques-
tion in each of these cases is whether the President has affirmatively
acted contrary to the congressional will.32 When he does, even the
concept of shared powers becomes untenable.33 The President acted
24. Id. at 74. As an example, the 1973 fiscal year is from June 1972 to June
1973. Congress did not appropriate OEO funds for fiscal year 1973 before June
of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-424, 86 Stat. 688 (Sept. 19, 1972).
25. 358 F. Supp. at 74.
26. Id. at 79. The court cited congressional provisions for the termination of
the supersonic transport program when funds were cut off for that program. The
court would not presume that Congress would act in an irresponsible manner by
neither appropriating more funds for OEO nor providing funds for its termination.
27. Id. at 75, 76.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
29. 358 F. Supp. at 74.
30. See Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exer-
cise in Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REv. 502, 510-11, 536 (1965).
31. Id. at 511, 536.
32. Id. at 511.
33. Id. at 511, 536. The concept of shared powers contemplates two branches




in contravention of a congressional statute in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,34 the leading case concerning presidential power.
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and
operate the nation's steel mills in order to prevent what he believed
would be a disastrous steel strike during the Korean War. The steel
companies complied under protest but challenged the action in the
federal courts. The Supreme Court held that since Congress had con-
sidered and rejected the possibility of presidential seizure when formu-
lating the Taft-Hartley Act, the President could not countermand
congressional rejection of this power. 5 In his concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Jackson proposed that the constitutional basis for presiden-
tial action taken contrary to congressional legislation is weaker than
when the President acts in the absence of congressional legislation.-6
It has been suggested that his explanation of the difference between
the two types of presidential action has been accepted as law.37
The Supreme Court has invalidated other acts of the executive
branch also in violation of specific congressional legislation. 38 The
same subject. The branches involved almost always are the legislative and the
executive. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960).
34. 343 U.S. 579 (1932).
35. Id. at 586-88. The Court's opinion was based on a strict separation of
powers argument that refused to grant the President any legislative power what-
soever. This opinion interpreted the constitutional provision in article I, section
1, which vests all legislative power in the Congress, according to the section's
plain meeting.
36. 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical mat-
ter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories
of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control
in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
343 U.S. at 637-38 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
37. Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds:
With Special Reference to Grants-In-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 Am. U.L.
R~v. 32, 41 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Goostree].
38. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
170 (1804); see The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868).
19741
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Court, however, has upheld executive action in the absence of explicit
authorization when the executive act constituted a logical extension
of a cabinet function created by Congress.39 In addition, the Court
has upheld executive action when Congress, by its continued acquies-
cence in the executive act, tacitly recognized that the action was an
exercise of a power relinquished by Congress to the President or was
an outright valid exercise of presidential power.40 In the impound-
ment area the Court has ruled, under the "faithfully execute"
clause, 41 that the executive branch cannot withhold credit for pay-
ments to an individual when Congress has specifically legislated such
payment.42 This decision, however, involved only a ministerial ques-
tion, not a policy question. 43
The executive power to determine spending in policy questions
depends upon the administrative discretion given to the executive
branch by Congress. In Commonwealth v. Connor44 a federal district
court held that since a congressional act gave discretion to the Secre-
tary of the Interior to approve a state's contract right arising out of
the statue,45 a claim on such a contract was not of a ministerial nature
39. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
40. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). See also
Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 325 (1942).
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
42. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
The Court stated:
It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone subject to
the direction and control of the President, with respect to the execution of
the duty imposed upon him by this law; and this right of the President is
claimed, as growing out of the obligation imposed upon him by the constitu-
tion, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This is a doctrine that
cannot receive the sanction of this court. It would be vesting in the President
a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of
the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its re-
sults, to all cases falling within it would be clothing the President with a
power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the admin-
istration of justice.
To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.
Id. at 612. Accord, United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898); United
States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); United States v. Jordan, 113 U.S. 418 (1885).
43. Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38
GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 124, 127 (1969).
44. 248 F. Supp. 656 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 366 F.2d 778 (lst Cir.
1966).




and thus could not be enforced by mandamus in federal district
court.4 6 In McKay v. Central Electric Power Cooperative47 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia similarly held that when
Congress did not expressly command the Secretary of the Interior to
spend appropriations for a specified purpose, the Department of the
Interior had policy discretion to determine allocations.4s
There is no executive policy discretion, however, when Congress
has specifically stated the policy to be followed. The enunciation of
a clear congressional purpose for appropriation was the determining
factor in State Highway Commissian v. Volpe,4 9 in which the Eighth
Circuit refused to permit the Secretary of Transportation to defer
authority to obligate highway funds previously apportioned to states
by statute 0 due to inflationary pressures on the economy.51 The legis-
lative history of the Act clearly forbade presidential impoundment
for inflationary reasons.5 2 Moreover, the Act included a section stat-
ing it was the intent of Congress that funds should neither be im-
pounded nor withheld.53 The appellate court held that, although
the general appropriations act may not have provided a mandate
to spend all of the funds appropriated, the Highway Act had cir-
cumscribed the Secretary's discretion in spending funds5 4 and did not
permit the Secretary to withhold his approval of projects for reasons
not contemplated within the Act.r5 A federal district court in City
of New York v. Ruckelshaus- similarly held that no portion of the
allotments could be impounded when the language and legislative
history of an Act, 17 and the subsequently overridden presidential veto
of the Act, indicated an understanding that allotment of the authori-
zation in the Act would be mandatory.5 8
46. 248 F. Supp. at 659.
47. 223 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
48. Id. at 625. The Department of the Interior thus had the discretion to cancel
a contract for a subject not within the Department's priorities.
49. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
50. Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1970).
51. 479 F.2d at 1103, 1116.
52. H.R. RrP. No. 1554, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
53. 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
54. Id. § 106(a).
55. 479 F.2d at 1109-10.
56. 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
57. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
1285, 1287 (Supp. II, 1972).
58. 358 F. Supp. at 679.
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The most frequently cited source for presidential impoundments is
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1951, which amended the Anti-
Deficiency Act of 1905-06. The 1951 provision states:
In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established
to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings
are made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater
efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the
date on which such appropriation was made available. When-
ever it is determined by an officer ... to make apportionments
and reapportionments that any amount so reserved will not be
required to carry out the purposes of the appropriation concerned,
he shall recommend the rescission of such amount ....
The legislative history of the amending Act specifically emphasized
that this provision could not be used to thwart a major policy of Con-
gress. 60
Vague terms in a statute give the President considerable latitude in
impounding funds.61 A constitutional issue arises, however, when the
President acts contrary to the purpose of an appropriation by cancel-
ing or abbreviating a legislative program because he considers the
purpose unwise, wasteful or inexpedient.62
The constitutional question in State Highway Commission v. Volpe
concerned a deferral of apportioned funds. In City of New York v.
Ruckelshhaus the'issue in'volvdd a partial impoundment of an authori-
zation. But in Phillips the authorized funds were to be spent for
entirely terminating CAA programs that were established under the
OEO Act.63 The total dismantling of a congressional program because
of an alternative presidential proposal in the Budget Message was a
justification that originated under the Nixon Administration. 4 Previ-
ous Administration justifications stressed that impoundment was
59. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
60. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950).
61. Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 135, 160 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fisher].
62. Fisher, supra note 43, at 125-26.
63. The federal district court said this might be a violation of 31 U.S.C. §
628 (1970), which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, sums ap-
propriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be
applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no





necessary to avoid deficiencies,65 to create savings,6- or to control in-
flation.6z
The executive branch in Phillips, unlike in McKay and Connor,
had no policy discretion to allot legislated funds. The court in
Phillips thus realized that if the executive action was ruled valid the
President would be legislating under his statutory obligation to sub-
mit a budget38 and would possess a veto power not found in the Con-
stitution5 That court carried these implications one step further by
reasoning that there would be no limit on how often the executive
branch could ignore other congressional authorizations if defendant,
as a member of the executive branch, possessed the power to terminate
CAA funding and to dismantle OEO.70 The court in Phillips thus
realized that such a result would threaten the viability of the con-
gressional power to legislate under article I of the Constitution since
the executive branch could completely usurp the legislative power of
Congress. 71 Just as the majority and Mr. Justice Jackson refused to
limit the congressional action in Youngstown 7 2 the district court in
Phillips similarly refused to undermine the congressional authoriza-
tion for OEO.
The Phillips decision does not automatically prevent the presiden-
tial impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds because
many budgetary schemes and justifications still exist through which
the executive branch can bypass congressional intent.7 3 Nevertheless,
until the Supreme Court has ruled on the specific issue in this case,
65. Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congres-
sional Control Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1240, 1245 (1970);
Fisher 162.
66. Church, supra note 65, at 1245; Fisher 162.
67. Fisher 162. See also Church, supra note 65, at 1248. Senator Frank Church
(D. Idaho) notes that although Presidents often promise to release impounded
funds in the future, the release of such funds has often not been forthcoming. As
a result, some congressional programs have been buried.
68. 358 F. Supp. at 75; see Goostree 37-38.
69. 358 F. Supp. at 74; accord, Goostree 38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
70. 358 F. Supp. at 77.
71. Id. at 76-77; Goostree 37-38. Goostree believes that this result would occur
if, under the "faithfully execute" clause of article II, section 3, the President could
refuse to execute laws.
72. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
73. See generally Fisher.
1974]
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presidential budgetary priorities as a constitutional justification for
impounding authorized funds and spending appropriated funds
against the congressional purpose are effectively eliminated. Because
the impoundment struggle occurs in a political and not a legal
arena,74 the future impact of the Phillips decision will depend on how
the executive branch interprets its legislative mandate in years to
come.
Sheldon B. Toibb
74. Fisher, supra note 43, at 136.
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